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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order denying in part a motion to
compel arbitration and staying arbitration on other claims.
Jurisdiction is therefore granted under Utah Code Annotated
§§ 78-31a-19(l) and (2). The jurisdictional issues in this case
have been fully briefed in response to the Court's sua sponte
motion regarding jurisdiction; this Court concluded, in its Order
dated August 8, 1997, that an immediate right of direct appeal
exists.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that
plaintiffs have not agreed to arbitrate their claims that Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Utah ("BCBSU") failed to provide them with
an appropriate conversion policy.
This issue was raised and argued at several different points
in the case below, including in BCBSU's original Motion to Compel
Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings Against Defendant Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Utah (R. 9 et

seq.)

that motion (R. 12 et seq.),

in appellant's objection to

, in the memorandum supporting

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend or Clarify Ruling (R. 198 et seg.),
in BCBSU's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
BCBSU's Motion to Reconsider, (R. 209 et seg.) and in Defendant's
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider.
seg. )
241145.1

(R 233 et

The Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions
interpreting the scope of the arbitration clause as an issue of
law, without deferring to the trial judge's interpretation.
Docutel

Olivetti

v. Dick

Brady

Systems,

Inc.,

731 P.2d 475, 479

(Utah 1986).
RELEVANT STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-703 (1997) reads in pertinent

part as follows:
Conversion rights on termination of group disability
insurance coverage
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) through (5),
all policies of disability insurance offered on a group
basis under this title, or Title 49, Chapter 8, Group
Insurance Program Act shall provide that a person whose
insurance under the group policy has been terminated
for any reason, and who has been continuously insured
under the group policy or its predecessor for at least
six months immediately prior to termination, is
entitled to choose either a converted individual or
group policy of disability insurance from the insurer
which conforms to this part and other applicable
versions of this title, or an extension of benefits
under the group policy as provided in Section 31A-22714.
In addition, Section 3 of the Utah Arbitration Act provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing or future
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or
equity to set aside the agreement or when fraud is
alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
U t a h Code Ann. § 7 8 - 3 1 a - 3
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from an order denying, in part, a motion
to compel arbitration and staying arbitration as to those claims
determined to be arbitrable.
Plaintiffs (the "0'Connells") have been and remain BCBSU
subscribers under different healthcare agreements for over 20
years. R.l.

From time to time, they obtained this coverage by

virtue of their memberships in different groups. R.2.

Mrs.

O'Connell was an employee of Rowland Hall-St. Mark's, and the
couple obtained coverage from BCBSU at times under that group
policy. R.2-3.
R.2.

Mr. O'Connell is a member of the Utah State Bar.

The couple have also obtained BCBSU coverage in the past

under the State Bar group policy. R.2.
The latest instance of coverage under these two groups was
obtained by the 0'Connells in 1993. R.2.

On September 30, 1993,

Mrs. O'Connell completed an application for coverage through
Rowland Hall-St. Mark's. R.79.

In making that application, Mrs.

O'Connell agreed to the following language:
I accept binding arbitration as a method of resolving
any disputes arising between me or the covered family
members in the Plan or participating provider

241145 1
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concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable
under the Subscriber Agreement.
R. 79.
The O'Connells were accepted onto the Rowland Hall-St.
Mark's policy in 1993, and were given a healthcare agreement (the
"Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare Agreement") reading in part
as follows:
In the event of any dispute or controversy concerning
the construction, interpretation, performance or breach
of the Agreement arising between the Group, employer,
or Subscriber, eligible Family Dependent, or the heirat-law or personal representative of such person, and
BCBSU, whether involving a claim in tort, contract or
otherwise, the same shall be submitted to arbitration
under the appropriate rules of the American Arbitration
Association. Any arbitration shall be conducted in
Salt Lake City, Utah, unless mutually agreed otherwise
by the parties. All fees connected with initiating
demand for arbitration shall be split between and
advanced by the parties to the arbitration; subject,
however, to final apportionment by the arbitrator in
his or her award. The parties agree that the
arbitrator's award shall be binding and may be enforced
in any court having jurisdiction thereof by filing a
petition for enforcement of said award.
R. 85.
In 1995, the O'Connells attempted to switch their coverage
from Rowland Hall-St. Mark's to the Utah State Bar group.

R. 44.

The application for the Utah State Bar coverage contains language
virtually identical to that quoted above for the application for
the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's coverage, R. 44, and the Utah State
Bar Healthcare Agreement contains language virtually identical to

241145 1
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that contained in the Healthcare Agreement issued to members of
the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's group, including Mrs. O'Connell.
41.

R.

The O'Connells' application to resubscribe to the Utah State

Bar group was rejected based on Mrs. O'Connells' medical history.
R.3.
BCBSU, pursuant to the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare
Agreement, issued the O'Connells a conversion policy after her
continuation coverage under the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Health
Care Agreement expired.
II,

R. 48.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The O'Connells sued BCBSU designating four causes of action.
First, they claimed that the refusal to provide coverage under
what they perceived as the more favorable Utah State Bar
Healthcare Agreement breached the terms of the Rowland Hall-St.
Mark's Agreement.

R. 5.

Second, they alleged that BCBSU had

made oral promises that they could freely move back and forth
between the Bar group and the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's group.
6.

R.

Third, they alleged that BCBSU "has breached its contract and

statutory obligation to provide individual coverage to plaintiffs
comparable to that provided through the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's
group at a reasonable rate and not based upon condition of the
plaintiff's health."

R. 6.

Finally, they alleged that BCBSU's

refusal to accept them onto the Utah State Bar coverage violated
241145 1
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some "constructive duty to deal with plaintiffs fairly and in
good faith" based allegedly upon the "long-standing relationship
between plaintiffs and [BCBSU]."

R. 8.

BCBSU moved to compel arbitration as to all of these claims.
R. 9.

After detailed briefing, the trial court granted the

motion to compel arbitration on October 8, 1996.

R. 183-190.

On

October 16, plaintiffs moved to amend or clarify that ruling.

R.

192.

The basis for this was plaintiffs' claim that a portion of

their claims were based on a statutory right under Utah Code
Annotated § 31A-22-701-718, which requires group healthcare
insurance policies to provide for a conversion right. R.192-196.
On December 18, 1996, the trial court modified its prior order,
stating in pertinent part:
The Court finds the issue of whether defendant met its
statutory obligation pursuant to the applicable
sections of 31A-22-701(-)718 can be and is severed from
the other issues in this case, and amends its judgment
accordingly. The Court finds that the language of the
arbitration provision signed by the plaintiff does not
appear to address the issue of whether defendant has
provided the plaintiffs with a conversion policy in
accordance to the statute previously mentioned.
Further, even if the arbitration provisions
specifically provided for the matter of defendant's
compliance with the statute, the Court has some
reservations in leaving such issues of statutory
interpretation to arbitration.

241145 1
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R. 206.

The Court then went on to direct the parties to brief

the issue of whether the conversion policy issued to the
plaintiff complied with the conversion statute. R.206-207.
Rather than brief this issue, BCBSU requested that the trial
court reconsider its ruling, arguing that the conversion rights
were covered by the arbitration provisions at issue. R.209-220.
On April 8, 1997, the trial court denied this motion to
reconsider, stayed arbitration and ordered BCBSU to file an
answer concerning plaintiffs' so-called statutory claims.
and 249.

BCBSU then took this appeal.
III.

R. 248

R. 251.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT

In sum, the district court rejected plaintiffs' arguments
that they had not agreed to arbitration, but later concluded that
the statutory claim for a comparable conversion policy was not
covered by the arbitration clauses at issue.

R. 183-190; R. 206.

This appeal concerns that interpretation of the breadth of those
arbitration provisions, and the nature of the conversion right to
which the O'Connells make claim.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The conversion right is a contractual right, provided in
this case within the O'Connells' Rowland Hall-St. Mark's
Healthcare Agreement.

The Utah statutes governing conversion

merely impose substantive requirements on that BCBSU contract.
241145 1
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The statute, by its unambiguous terms, does not create an
independent cause of action.
Regardless, however, of whether the right to conversion is
viewed as contractual or statutory, it cannot be maintained that
"conversion" does not contemplate an existing healthcare
agreement.

Without such agreement, there is nothing from which

to "convert."

BCBSU's provision of a conversion policy, or

failure to provide an appropriate one, is necessarily part of
BCBSU's performance under its original healthcare agreement, in
this case the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare Agreement.

The

O'Connells' claim that Blue Cross has not provided an appropriate
conversion policy is therefore plainly covered by the broad
arbitration clause contained in that original Rowland Hall-St.
Mark's Healthcare Agreement.

This claim necessarily concerns the

"construction, interpretation, performance or breach of" that
original Agreement.

Indeed, the plaintiffs' claim is founded on

the notion the conversion policy is somehow not comparable to
that original coverage.

The trial court erred in severing out

the conversion claim from the other claims raised in this case
and in failing to compel arbitration with respect to all claims.
ARGUMENT
A conversion right is the right to convert insurance under a
group policy to an individual policy.
241145 1
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Appleman, Insurance

Law

and Practice,

§ 126 (West 1981).

The right sought by the

O'Connells in this case is the right to obtain an individual
policy following the termination of Mrs. O'Connells' eligibility
for continuing coverage as a member of the Rowland Hall-St.
Mark's group.

More specifically, the O'Connells claim a right to

a policy with premiums comparable to the former group policy.
Blue Cross has issued the O'Connells a conversion policy, but
maintains that it is not required to provide it at the same price
as that of their former group policy.
That legal issue, however, is not before the Court.
Instead, this appeal concerns whether this dispute is subject to
an arbitration provision in the O'Connells' Healthcare Agreement
with Blue Cross.

The O'Connells' claim is based on a contractual

right, and Blue Cross's provision of the conversion policy to the
O'Connells necessarily arises out of its contractual relationship
with them.

As such, this dispute is subject to the mandatory

arbitration provision contained in the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's
Healthcare Agreement.
I.

THE CONVERSION RIGHT IS CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE

The Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare Agreement addresses
the right of conversion.

It provides:

5.
Group eligibility discontinued. In the event the
Subscriber ceases to be eligible for group coverage in
accordance with then effective rules and regulations of
241145.1

9

BCBSU pertaining to enrollment, this Certificate and
all coverage hereunder shall automatically terminate
effective as of the first month's anniversary of the
Effective Date following the date on which the
Subscriber ceases to be eligible for group coverage.
Any such Subscriber who has been covered under this
Certificate for a period of at least six months may,
within thirty (30) days after termination of this
Certificate, apply for conversion of coverage in
accordance with then effective rules and regulations of
BCBSU pertaining to enrollment.
R. 244.

It is this right to convert, provided under the

contract, that the O'Connells seek to enforce.
The O'Connells have pointed to Utah's conversion statute as
providing them a separate right.

The unambiguous terms of that

statute show that, rather than create an abstract right to
conversion, the statute merely imposes substantive requirements
on the underlying contracts.

Specifically, the statute requires

that
all policies of disability insurance1 offered on a
group basis under this title . . . shall provide that a
person whose insurance under group policy has been
terminated for any reason . . . is entitled to choose
either a converted individual group policy of
disability insurance from the insurer . . . or an
extension of benefits under the group policy as
provided in Section 31A-22-714.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-703 (1997) .

Thus, the statute imposes a

requirement on the contract terms, and the insured's underlying

1

The term "disability insurance," as defined by the Utah
Insurance Code, includes the health insurance provided by BCBSU to the
O'Connells. Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-1-301(26) and (35) (1997).
241145.1
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right to claim conversion thus arises out of that contractual
relationship.
This obvious proposition is supported by more than the
literal terms of the statute.

There is no free-floating right to

be accepted onto an individual policy available to the public at
large.

At the time the O'Connells obtained their conversion

policy 2 , their right to do so depended on prior enrollment in a
group policy.

Thus, the issuance of the conversion policy is

part and parcel of the insurer's performance of its obligations
under that prior group policy relationship.

Absent that prior

relationship under the group policy of Rowland Hall-St. Mark's,
Blue Cross had no obligation whatsoever to issue any sort of
policy to the O'Connells.
II. THE O'CONNELLS' ASSERTED RIGHT TO CONVERSION
FALLS WITHIN THE CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION CLAUSE
The clause in the O'Connells' Rowland Hall-St. Mark's
Healthcare Agreement requiring arbitration is broad.

2

It reads:

The O'Connells' ability to obtain replacement coverage has
changed significantly since their earlier application that generated
this lawsuit. With the passage and implementation of the federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), P.L.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), they can now obtain the State Bar
coverage without respect to any pre-existing medical condition, so
long as they remain eligible and possess sufficiently continuous
creditable coverage, which they presently do. That change in law,
however, did not impact BCBSU's denial of enrollment on the State Bar
plan in 1995.
241145 1
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CV

'c

^

In the event of any dispute or controversy concerning
the construction, interpretation, performance or breach
of this Agreement arising between the Employer,
Subscriber, Eligible Family Member, and the Heir-at*-Law
or Personal Representative of such person and BCBSU,
whether involving a claim in tort, contract or
otherwise, the same shall be submitted to arbitration
under the appropriate rules of the American Arbitration
Association.

R. 166 (emphasis added).
In addition, when applying for this group policy, Ann O'Connell
signed directly below the following language:
rCfc

%

I accept Binding Arbitration as the method of resolving
any disputes arising between me or the covered family
members and the Plan [defined as Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Utah, ValueCare and/or HealthWise] or a
participating provider concerning the applicability of,
or benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement.

R. 162 (emphasis added)

Finally, the Certificate given to the

O'Connells provides in addition as follows, under the heading
"Claims Appeal Procedure":
STEP FOUR - Binding Arbitration

V ^ * * *
(<.'

c^-.f«

^

e**t*

Binding arbitration is the final step for the
resolution of any dispute a member has with BCBSU.
Steps One, Two and Three of this appeals procedure must
be exhausted before arbitration is available. [Steps
One, Two and Three involve bringing claims to the
customer service department, the claims appeal
committee and BCBSU's legal counsel, respectively.]
When one enrolls with BCBSU, he or she agrees that any
dispute will be resolved by binding arbitration, and
agrees to give up the right to a jury or a court trial
for the settlement of such disputes.

R. 165 (emphasis added)

241145.1
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The O'Connells now claim that BCBSU has failed to issue an
appropriate conversion policy from this original group policy.
This claim constitutes a dispute with BCBSU.

It involves the

construction and interpretation of the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's
group policy.

As discussed above, the right to conversion, as

well as BCBSU's provision of the conversion policy involves the
performance and alleged breach of the original Rowland HallSt. Mark's policy.
simple fact.

Even the O'Connells' pleading reflects this

In pleading this claim to the district court, the

0'Connells alleged:
Defendant has breached its contract and statutory
obligation to provide individual coverage to plaintiffs
comparable to that provided through the Rowland Hall
group at a reasonable rate and not based upon condition
of the plaintiff's health.
R. 6 (emphasis added).
These claims plainly fall within the scope of the multiple
arbitration provisions applicable to the O'Connells' Rowland
Hall-St. Mark's policy.

First, the right to conversion is

provided within the same contract containing the arbitration
clause requiring all disputes "concerning the construction,
interpretation, performance or breach of" that contract. R.166.
Plaintiffs have plead a breach of that right.

Second, even if a

parallel statutory claim existed, it still constitutes, by

241145.1
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definition, a claim concerning the performance or breach of the
original agreement.
An analogous circumstance exists when a claim for benefits
is brought under a conversion policy issued obtained through
conversion from an ERISA-covered plan.

In such case, the

plaintiff seeking benefits typically wishes to avoid the
preemptive scope of the ERISA statute.

Because the converted

policy is an individual policy, the argument goes, preemption
applicable to claims under the group policy does not affect the
claim for benefits under the conversion policy.

Several courts

have rejected this argument, recognizing that the claim for
benefits under the conversion policy arises out of the original
group benefits provided under the ERISA plan.

The United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, has
reasoned:
The opportunity to convert the group plan to an
individual policy is a benefit provided pursuant to the
group plan . . . the predicate to the conversion right,
under both ERISA and Montana law, is qualification as a
beneficiary under a group health or disability plan.
. . . No conversion benefits would be available unless
the party seeking the conversion policy was an eligible
insured beneficiary of a group plan.
The group plan within this case, which the [plaintiffs]
admit is an ERISA plan, provides for the conversion
benefit. Because the [plaintiffs] would not be
eligible for a conversion policy without first
belonging to the class of beneficiaries covered by the
ERISA group plan, we conclude that the individual

241145 1
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conversion benefits are part of the ERISA plan and are
thus governed by ERISA. Had the [plaintiffs] not
received health benefits pursuant to the ERISA group
plan, they would not have been eligible to receive*
conversion benefits and would have no cause of action
arising from the conversion policy.
Greany

v. Western

Farm Bureau

See also Tingey

(9th Cir. 1992) .
Inc.,

Life

Ins.
v.

Co.,

Picks ley-Richards

953 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1992); Quails

California,

973 F.2d 812, 817

v.

Blue

West,
Cross

of

22 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1994) (both holding that

conversion policy arises out of original ERISA coverage, and
therefore claim for benefits is preempted).

Similarly, any claim

the O'Connells might raise concerning their conversion coverage,
or BCBSU's alleged failure to provide appropriate conversion
coverage, necessarily presupposes a pre-existing contractual
relationship with BCBSU.
no right to conversion.

Without such a relationship, there is
Accordingly, all of the O'Connells'

potential claims concerning their conversion rights necessarily
arise out of the performance by BCBSU of its original contractual
obligations.

Without that original contract, there is no claim.

It need hardly be said that Utah law requires arbitration
provisions to be construed broadly, in favor of arbitration.
Docutel

Olivetti

v.

(Utah 1986); Lindon

Dick

Brady

City

v.

Engineers

1073 (Utah 1981) (quoting King

241145.1

Systems,
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Inc.,
Constr.
v. Boeing

731 P.2d 475, 479
Co.,
Co.,

636 P.2d 1070,
18 Wash.

App. 595, 570 P.2d 713, 717 (1977).

Any doubts concerning the

applicability of arbitration are likewise to be resolved in favor
of arbitration.

Id.

The O'Connells' claim that the conversion

policy issued to them pursuant to their Rowland Hall-St. Mark's
Healthcare Agreement is not comparable to their coverage under
the original Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Healthcare Agreement falls
unambiguously within the broad language of the arbitration
provisions of that group policy.

Utah law requires that all of

the O'Connells' claims be arbitrated, and the district court
erred in severing this claim from the O'Connells' other claims.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in refusing to compel arbitration
as to all of the O'Connells' claims against BCBSU in this matter.
Each such claim is plainly subject to the broad arbitration
clauses agreed to by the O'Connells.

The Court should reverse

the district court's order severing out the conversion claim and
remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration as to all
claims.

In addition, the remand order should direct the entry of

a reasonable attorneys' fee for BCBSU in connection with the
district court proceedings and this appeal, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31a-16 (1997).

241145.1
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STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM
The relevant statutes and portions of the Record (including
the relevant contractual provisions) are quoted in the brief.
Appellant believes an Addendum is unnecessary.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

7

day of December, 1997.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By_

Andrews H. S t o n e
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

/

day of December, 1997,

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF to the
following:
John D. O'Connell
3 9 Exchange Place, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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